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Abstract:   The value of statistical life (VSL) is a risk-to-money conversion factor that can be 
used to accurately approximate an individual’s willingness-to-pay for a small change in fatality 
risk.  If an individual’s VSL is (say) $7 million, then she will be willing to pay approximately $7 
for a 1-in-1-million risk reduction, $70 for a 1-in-100,000 risk reduction, and so forth. 
VSL has played a central role in the rapidly emerging economics literature about COVID-19.  
Many papers use VSL to assign a monetary value to the lifesaving benefits of social-distancing 
policies, so as to balance those benefits against lost income and other policy costs. This is not 
surprising, since VSL (known in the U.K. as “VPF”: value of a prevented fatality) has been a key 
tool in governmental cost-benefit analysis for decades and is well established among economists. 
Despite its familiarity, VSL is a flawed tool for analyzing social-distancing policy—and risk 
regulation more generally.  The standard justification for cost-benefit analysis appeals to Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency (potential Pareto superiority).  But VSL is only an approximation to individual 
willingness to pay, which may become quite inaccurate for policies that mitigate large risks 
(such as the risks posed by COVID-19)—and thus can recommend policies that fail the Kaldor-
Hicks test. 
This paper uses a simulation model of social-distancing policy to illustrate the deficiencies of 
VSL.  I criticize VSL-based cost-benefit analysis from a number of angles.  Its recommendations 
with respect to social distancing deviate dramatically from the recommendations of a utilitarian 
or prioritarian social welfare function.  In the model here, it does indeed diverge from Kaldor-
Hicks efficiency.  And its relative valuation of risks and financial costs among groups 
differentiated by age and income lacks intuitive support.  Economists writing about COVID-19 
need to reconsider using VSL.  
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I. Introduction  
Fatality risk regulation is the bread and butter of the U.S. regulatory state.  
Administrative agencies in the U.S. government are required to prepare written documents 
accompanying proposed major rules that evaluate the proposed rules using cost-benefit analysis 
(CBA)2; and the monetized benefit of fatality risk reduction, as per these documents, is the 
largest category of monetized benefit.3  
In particular, fatality risk reduction is central to the mission of the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA).  Anti-pollution rules enacted by this agency, over the last five 
decades, have yielded large decreases in individuals’ annual fatality risks; and much of the 
monetized fatality-risk-reduction benefit from federal regulation is attributable to the EPA.4  But 
other federal agencies also enact regulations that reduce fatality risks and evaluate these 
regulations by means of CBA, including a monetization of the risk-reduction benefit.  These 
include the Department of Transportation, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 
the Food and Drug Administration, the Department of Health and Human Services, and others.5 
 In general, CBA evaluates governmental policy by predicting, to the extent feasible, a 
policy’s effects on the components of individual well-being (income, health, fatality risk, 
environmental quality, leisure, etc.) and then measuring these effects on a monetary scale.6  The 
value of statistical life (VSL) is, in turn, the linchpin concept for monetizing risk reduction.7  
VSL can be thought of as a conversion factor for translating an individual’s risk change into a 
monetary equivalent.  Assume Suzy’s VSL is $7 million.  Then Suzy’s willingness to pay for a 
small risk reduction is approximately the reduction multiplied by $7 million (so that she is 
willing to pay $7 for a 1-in-1 million reduction, $70 for a 1-in-100,000 reduction, and $700 for a 
1-in-10,000 reduction). 
 Although VSL is, in principle, heterogeneous—Suzy’s VSL might well be different from 
Jana’s or Wu’s—the practice in the U.S. government is to use a population-average VSL, now on 
the order of $10 million.8  Note that the assumption of a single VSL leads to a simple formula for 
valuing lifesaving.  If a policy reduces expected deaths in the U.S. population next year by ∆D, 
then the sum total of individual risk reduction is ∆D; and if a single VSL is being used, the 
aggregate willingness to pay for the policy’s risk-reduction benefit is just ∆DVSL.  This 
calculation now occurs in numerous agency cost-benefit documents.   
                                                 
2 Executive Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1994). 
3 Office of Management and Budget (2017, p. 11). 
4 Id. at 10-16; Robinson (2007). 
5 See Viscusi (2018, ch. 2); Robinson (2007). 
6 See, e.g., Adler (2019); Adler and Posner (2006). 
7 See generally Viscusi (2018). 
8 On the U.S. government’s use of population-average VSL, see Robinson (2007); U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (2016); U.S. Department of Transportation (2016); U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (2010).  
For the $10 million figure, see Viscusi (2018, p. 28).   
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Other governments also employ VSL in governmental cost-benefit analysis, including the 
U.K.  The concept is the same, but the terminology may differ.  In the U.K., the term “value of a 
prevented fatality” is used instead of “value of statistical life,” and the corresponding 
abbreviation is “VPF” rather than “VSL.”9 
 Although U.S. governmental monetization of risk policy via VSL was, initially, 
controversial, that controversy has largely faded, and VSL is quite firmly entrenched in U.S. 
regulatory practice. It is also very well established in the academic literature.  Many articles in 
applied economics employ behavioral evidence, in particular wage differentials for riskier 
occupations, or stated-preference evidence, to estimate VSL.10  There is also a large theory 
literature about VSL.11   
 The COVID-19 pandemic has brought VSL to the fore.  Among the flood of academic 
working papers posted in immediate response to the pandemic, quite a number employ VSL to 
estimate the benefits of social-distancing requirements.12  Many opinion pieces and news articles 
have also discussed VSL.13 This is not unexpected.  Since VSL is now a cornerstone of U.S. 
governmental risk analysis, and the focus of decades of academic work, it is hardly surprising 
that academic and public discussion about COVID-19 policy would resort to VSL.  
 But VSL—despite its familiarity—is flawed.  VSL is flawed as a component of 
administrative routines for evaluating proposed regulations.  It gives us a misleading picture, for 
example, of the benefits of EPA’s anti-pollution regulations or the Department of 
Transportation’s safety requirements.  VSL is also a flawed basis for thinking about COVID-19 
policy.  Or so I shall argue here. 
 The deficits are the same in the two cases. VSL’s shortcomings as applied to COVID-19 
policy are no different from its shortcomings in evaluating anti-pollution rules, vehicle safety 
requirements, workplace safety regulations, and so forth.  In the years before the pandemic, 
various scholars, including myself, published careful academic critiques of VSL.14  These 
critiques didn’t prompt intensive academic or public conversation, because fatality risk 
                                                 
9 The U.K. also uses a considerably lower value for VSL than the U.S.  See Viscusi (2018, p. 38) on international 
differences in VSL. 
10 For overviews of the empirical literature on VSL, see Aldy & Viscusi (2007); Cropper, Hammitt and Robinson 
(2011); Kniesner and Viscusi (2019); Krupnick (2007); OECD (2012); Viscusi and Aldy (2003); Viscusi (2018). 
11 See, e.g., Eeckhoudt and Hammitt (2001); Evans and Smith (2010); Hammitt (2000, 2007); Hammitt et al. (2020); 
Johansson (2002); Jones-Lee et al. (2015). 
12 See, e.g., Alvarez, Argente and Lippi (2020); Bairoliya and Imrohoroğlu (2020); Barnett-Howell and Mobarak 
(2020); Béland, Brodeur and Wright (2020); Bethune and Korinek (2020); Greenstone and Nigam (2020); Gros et 
al. (2020); Pretnar (2020); Robinson, Sullivan and Shogren (2020); Scherbina (2020); Thurnstrom et al. (2020); 
Ugarov (2020); Wilson (2020). But see Pindyck (2020), criticizing the use of VSL; Hall, Jones and Klenow (2020), 
using VSL to calibrate a utilitarian social welfare function. 
13 See, e.g., Corcoran (2020); Henderson and Lipow (2020); Hilsenrath and Armour (2020) Ingraham (2020); 
Jenkins (2020); Masur and Posner (2020); Sunstein (2020). 
14 See Adler (2016a); Adler (2017); Adler (2019, ch. 5); Adler, Hammitt and Treich (2014); Adler, Ferranna, 
Hammitt and Treich (2019); Broome (1978); Bronsteen, Buccafusco and Masur (2013); Broughel (2020); Dolan et 
al. (2008); Grüne-Yanoff (2009).  
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regulation—in the years before the pandemic—wasn’t generally the topic of intensive academic 
and public conversation.  Certainly it was not for the first two decades of the 21st century, up 
until the terrible coronavirus outbreak of 2020.  The topics on the front burner were instead, e.g., 
terrorism, globalization, inequality, climate change, and democratic breakdown.  
 But the pandemic’s death toll, and the massive economic losses of shutdowns and social 
distancing, force us to think about balancing lives against livelihood.  Risk policy is now at the 
center of our conversations.  And so, too, we should use this moment to think about how we 
think about risk policy.  Is VSL really the best we can do?  No, it is not—or so I’ll claim.15 
 I’ll consider three different versions of VSL:  (1) textbook VSL, (2) population-average 
VSL, and (3) the “value of statistical life year” (VSLY).  Textbook VSL is as presented in the 
academic literature on CBA and VSL.  VSL, here, is an individual’s marginal rate of substitution 
between survival probability and money, and varies among individuals.  As mentioned above, 
U.S. governmental agencies depart from VSL and instead monetize VSL with a constant VSL, 
specifically a population average.  VSLY is a construct proposed by some scholars as a way to 
circumvent the flaws of textbook and population-average VSL.16 
 Various kinds of policy choices have bedeviled governments during the COVID-19 
pandemic, but perhaps the most important and salient such choice concerns social distancing 
policy.  Measures to reduce close physical proximity between individuals in the population can 
be expected to lower the fatality (and also morbidity) impacts of the pandemic, but at the cost of 
lost income as well as losses with respect to other dimensions of well-being.  This Article’s 
strategy will be to illustrate the flaws of the three versions of VSL—textbook, population-
average, and VSLY—with reference to social-distancing policy.  (As already mentioned, the 
academic papers that have appeared in response to the pandemic and that employ VSL mainly do 
so with respect to social distancing policy.)17 
 My main benchmark for evaluating VSL will be utilitarianism. Utilitarianism has been a 
dominant school of ethical thought for hundreds of years, since the work of Jeremy Bentham.  
Utilitarianism has endured through generations of academic and public debates about ethics, and 
continues to play a vibrant role at both levels.  To be sure, utilitarianism has hardly gone 
unchallenged.  It has endured over centuries of ethical debate.  In recent years, the chief 
opponents of utilitarianism within academic ethics have been non-consequentialists, in particular 
                                                 
15 See also Hammitt (2020), critically assessing the use of VSL to evaluate social-distancing policy.  
16 On VSLY, see Aldy and Viscusi (2007); Hammitt (2007); Hammitt et al. (2020); Jones-Lee et al. (2015); 
Kniesner and Viscusi (2019); Viscusi (2018, ch. 5).  
17 A second type of policy choice that was much discussed early in the pandemic was triage—in particular, how to 
allocate lifesaving equipment to seriously ill COVID-19 patients (namely, ventilators) under scarcity.  The 
academics engaged in that debate were principally health ethicists, who tend not to favor CBA; and thus CBA and 
VSL played little (if any) role in their analyses.  Still, VSL-based CBA is a global methodology for assessing any 
kind of policy involving fatality risk and certainly could be applied to triage. Thus applied, it would be no less 
problematic than VSL-based CBA applied to social distancing.  So as not to try the reader’s patience in belaboring 
the difficulties of the three types of VSL with respect to both social distancing and triage, I focus here on the former.  
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“contractualists” and deontologists.  However, I’m going to leave aside non-consequentialism 
and focus on a consequentialist critique of VSL—specifically, a critique from the vantage point 
of utilitarianism.18  
 Utilitarianism and CBA are not the same. There are key, structural, dissimilarities 
between the two that can yield divergent recommendations in many different policy domains, 
including fatality risk policy.  
 A secondary benchmark for my assessment of VSL will be prioritarianism.19  
Prioritarianism is a variation on utilitarianism that has emerged in ethics over the last several 
decades, and (as suggested by the name) gives extra weight to the well-being of the worse off.20  
It is appealing to those who are impressed by utilitarianism’s consequentialist structure and 
attention to individual well-being, but believe that utilitarianism’s exclusive focus on the sum 
total of well-being is too narrow.  Instead, prioritarianism considers both the sum total and the 
distribution of well-being.  
 In developing my critique of VSL-based CBA from the standpoint of utilitarianism and 
prioritarianism, I will rely upon a simulation model that is built upon the U.S. population 
survival curve and income distribution, and that will be used as a testbed for balancing the 
benefits and costs of social distancing policy.   
 The standard defense of CBA appeals to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency (potential Pareto 
superiority).21  Assume that CBA picks policy option P*, as opposed to a second option P—
which could be the status quo, or alternatively the option chosen by a competing policy 
framework such as utilitarianism or prioritarianism.  Then there is in principle a change ∆T to the 
tax-and-transfer system such that P* together with ∆T is Pareto superior to P.  ∆T would take the 
form of increased taxes upon (or lowered transfer payments to) those better off with P* than P, 
and increased transfer payments to (or lowered taxes upon) those better off with P than P*.  In 
recent years, work by Louis Kaplow has extended the Kaldor-Hicks defense of CBA, by showing 
that ∆T exists not merely in a lump-sum tax system but even in a system (such as ours) where 
taxes are levied on income and thus increased taxes have a distortionary effect.22 
                                                 
18 Non-consequentialists have struggled to formulate a systematic account of the ethics of risk. For a recent attempt, 
see Frick (2015).  Utilitarianism experiences no such difficulty.  Further, CBA itself is consequentialist.  It will be 
especially illuminating, I hope, to set forth a critique of VSL that is not merely a rehash of the criticisms that non-
consequentialists level against all forms of consequentialism—but instead is a critique from within the 
consequentialist camp, namely from the standpoint of utilitarianism and, secondarily, prioritarianism. 
19 Utilitarianism and prioritarianism are operationalized for policy assessment as social welfare functions (SWFs). 
On utilitarian and prioritarian SWFs, see generally Adler (2019).  On these SWFs applied specifically to risk 
regulation, see Adler (2016a); Adler (2017); Adler (2019, ch. 5); Adler, Hammitt and Treich (2014); Adler, 
Ferranna, Hammitt and Treich (2019). 
20 Parfit (2000) is the seminal philosophical text on prioritarianism.  For defenses, and overviews of the subsequent 
philosophical literature, see Adler (2012, ch. 5); Holtug (2010, 2017). 
21 See Adler and Posner (2006), discussing and criticizing this defense. 
22 See Kaplow (1996; 2004; 2008). 
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 The Kaldor-Hicks defense of CBA has been vigorously challenged.  These challenges are 
set forth in a substantial academic literature debating the Kaldor-Hicks criterion.23  Perhaps the 
strongest challenge is this: the change ∆T to the tax system is a purely potential change.  Either 
∆T  is actually implemented together with P*, in which case any Pareto-respecting assessment 
methodology (e.g., utilitarianism) will prefer P* plus ∆T to P; or ∆T is not implemented together 
with P*, in which case some are worse off with the policy and the Pareto criterion is not 
applicable.  Indeed, in actual U.S. practice, administrative rules and new statutory provisions are 
rarely coupled with tax-and-transfer changes designed to compensate those who are made worse 
off; and regulatory agencies are instructed to engage in CBA regardless of whether they 
anticipate such a compensatory change. 
 For purposes of this Article, however, I will place to one side these well-known critiques 
of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.  Assume that the reader accepts the Kaldor-Hicks criterion.  Should 
she, therefore, accept VSL-based CBA as a tool for evaluating fatality risk regulation and, more 
specifically, COVID-19 policy? 
 No.  VSL-based CBA can deviate from the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. An individual’s VSL, 
multiplied by the change in fatality risk that would result from a given policy, is only an 
approximation to her willingness to pay for that change.  This approximation becomes poorer as 
the change becomes larger.  Thus CBA with textbook VSL, used to assess policies that involve 
significant changes in individuals’ risks, can readily favor policies that are not Kaldor-Hicks 
efficient relative to alternatives that CBA disprefers.  And CBA with population-average VSL or 
VSLY can deviate from Kaldor-Hicks efficiency even for small changes in individuals’ risks.  
We’ll see, specifically, that all three approaches assign a positive score to a range of social 
distancing policies, preferring these policies to the status quo—even though the policies are not 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient relative to the status quo.  
 The structure of the Article is as follows.  Part II provides the conceptual framework.  
Part III uses the simulation model based upon the U.S. survival curve and income distribution to 
illustrate the implications of textbook VSL (as defined in Part II) with respect to social 
distancing policy, as compared to utilitarianism and prioritarianism, and to assess whether VSL 
conforms to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion.  Part IV does the same for CBA using population 
average VSL, and Part V for VSLY.  
 The aim of the Article, it should be stressed, is not to provide guidance with respect to 
social distancing policy.  Rather, its aim is methodological: to argue that VSL-based CBA 
provides flawed guidance.  The simulation model is used as a diagnostic tool, to bring to light the 
deficiencies of VSL-based CBA—to demonstrate how the guidance it provides is different from 
that of utilitarianism, prioritarianism, and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. 
                                                 
23 See Adler (2012, pp. 98-104), citing sources. For a response to Kaplow, see Adler (2019, pp. 225-33); Adler 
(2017). 
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II. The Concept of VSL  
 Roughly speaking, VSL is an individual’s marginal rate of substitution between money 
(income, consumption, wealth) and survival probability.  It captures how money and survival 
trade off in terms of the individual’s utility. 
 Providing a more precise definition of VSL depends on how utility is conceptualized.  
The conceptual framework I’ll be using in this paper, a discrete-time and multi-period model, is 
as follows.  An individual’s life is divided into periods numbered 1, 2, … T, with T, the 
maximum number of periods that any individual lives.  An individual either dies immediately 
after the beginning of the period or does not die and survives, at least, until the end of the period.  
 The number of the current period, for individual i, is Ai. (For example, if periods are 
years, and individual i is currently age 20, then Ai = 21.) 
 In the status quo, individual i has a lifetime profile of survival probabilities ( ,..., )i
A T
i ip p . 
These are conditional probabilities: namely, t
ip  is the probability that individual i survives to the 
end of period t, given that she is alive at the beginning.   
 Individual i also has a status quo lifetime profile of income and non-income attributes. 
1 11 1(( , ),..., ( , ), ( , ),..., ( , ))i i i i
A A A A T T
i i i i i i i iy b y b y b y b
  .  If t is a past period (t < Ai),
t
iy is the income that 
individual i earned in period t and t
ib denotes the non-income attributes that she had in that 
period.  If t is the current period or a future period (t ≥ Ai), then
t
iy is the income which i will earn 
in period t if she survives to its end, and t
ib is the bundle of non-income attributes which she’ll 
have in that period if she survives to its end. 
 For short, let (pi, yi, bi) denote individual’s status quo lifetime profile of survival 
probabilities, incomes, and non-income attributes.  
 Individual i has a lifetime utility function.  Let Ui(∙) denote expected utility.  Individual 
i’s status quo expected utility, at present, is 
1 1 1(( , ,..., ), (( , ),..., ( , ),..., ( , )))i i i i
A A A AT T T
i i i i i i i i i iU p p p y b y b y b

 or, for short, Ui(pi, yi, bi). 
 Note that the framework is quite general. Periods can be arbitrarily long or short.  Non-
income attributes of any sort (health, leisure, happiness, public goods, etc.) can be included in the 
period bundles.  An individual’s consumption in each period might be set equal to her income; 
or, instead, the individual might be supposed to have access to intertemporal financial markets, 
allowing her to save and to borrow against anticipated income, and to engage in saving and 
borrowing in either a perfectly or imperfectly rational manner.  Finally, the lifetime utility 
function might be temporally additive or non-additive. 
 Assume that individual i’s survival probability in period s is increased, relative to the 
status quo, by ∆pis.  Period s is either the current period or a future period (s ≥ Ai).  Let m(∆pis) 
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denote the reduction to individual i’s current status quo income that just suffices to make her 
indifferent to this improvement in survival probability.24  Then s
iVSL  , individual’s i’s VSL with 
respect to changes in survival probability in period s, is the limit of the ratio of m(∆pis) to ∆pis: 
0
( )
lim
s
i
s
s i
i s
p
i
m p
VSL
p 



.  Equivalently, s
iVSL  is the marginal rate of substitution between survival 
probability in period s and current income. 
(1) 
( , , )
/
/ i i ii
s
s i i
i A
i i
U p
VSL
U y
 
 
 
p y b
  
The numerator in this fraction is the status quo marginal utility of period s survival probability ; 
the denominator is the status quo marginal utility of current income.  s
iVSL is the ratio of these 
marginal utilities.25 
 CBA is standardly defined as the sum of individual “compensating variations” or 
“equivalent variations.”26  A given governmental policy is some departure from the status quo.  
An individual’s “compensating variation” for the policy is the change to her current income with 
the policy—the current income that she would have, were the policy to be implemented—that 
would just suffice to make her indifferent between the policy and the status quo.  An individual’s 
“equivalent variation” for the policy is the change to her current status quo income that would 
just suffice to make her indifferent between the policy and the status quo.27 
 VSL is a useful construct, for purposes of CBA, because it can be used to define an 
individual monetary valuation for a policy that is a good approximation to her compensating 
variation or equivalent variation—if the policy is a small change from the status quo.  In general, 
I’ll use the symbol “MV” to denote this VSL-based monetary valuation of a policy: one that well 
                                                 
24 In other words, if s is the current period, m(∆pis) is such that 
1 1 1 1 1
(( , , ..., ), (( , ), ..., ( ( ), ), ..., ( , ))) (( , ..., ), (( , ), ..., ( , ), ..., ( , )))i i i i i i i
A A A A A A AT s T T T T T
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
s
iU p p p p y b y m p b y b U p p y b y b y b

    
. If s is a future period,  m(∆pis) is such that: 
1 1 1 1
(( , ..., , ..., ), (( , ), ..., ( ( ), ), ..., ( , ))) (( , ..., ), (( , ), ..., ( , ), ..., ( , )))i i i i i i
A A A A A As s T T T T T T
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i
s
iU p p p p y b y m p b y b U p p y b y b y b      
25 In one-period models, VSL is often defined as the marginal rate of substitution between survival probability and 
wealth rather than income.  See, e.g., Eeckhoudt and Hammitt (2001).  However, in a multiperiod model in which 
individuals have exogenous incomes in each period, it is more straightforward to define VSL in terms of this 
exogenous attribute rather than to construct an endogenous wealth attribute and then define VSL in terms of that. 
See Adler et al. (2019).  If individuals are modelled as behaving myopically (consuming income and other resources 
available in each period, rather than saving and borrowing), then income equals wealth except perhaps in the first 
period (an inheritance).  If individuals save and borrow, then VSL defined in terms of income will reflect 
opportunities to save and borrow.   
Further, the sum of compensating variations whether defined in terms of income or wealth signals a 
potential Pareto improvement (Kaldor-Hicks efficiency), and thus VSL whether defined in terms of income or 
wealth coheres with the traditional justification for CBA (namely that VSL for small changes is a good 
approximation to the compensating variation).  
26 See, e.g., Adler and Posner (2006); Boadway (2016); Freeman (2003, ch. 3). 
27 See Appendix D for formulas for the equivalent and compensating variations. 
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approximates the individual’s compensating and equivalent variations if the policy is a small 
change from the status quo.  And I’ll use the term “VSL-CBA” to mean the version of CBA that 
assesses policies by summing these MV values. 
 In particular, imagine that a policy increases individual i’s period s survival probability 
by ∆pis.  Then MVi = ( )
s s
i ip VSL .  Alternatively, imagine that a policy increases individual i’s 
period s survival probability by ∆pis and increases her current income by i
A
iy .  Then MVi = 
( ) i
As s
i i ip VSL y  .
28 
 These formulas show why VSL can be thought of as a conversion factor that translates 
risk changes into monetary equivalents.  If a policy changes i’s period s survival probability by 
∆pis, the monetary equivalent for that risk change is ( )
s s
i ip VSL .  This monetary equivalent is 
added to the monetary equivalents for the other policy impacts on individual i to determine her 
overall monetary valuation (MVi) of the policy.  In the simple case where the policy only 
changes i’s period s survival probability, MVi is equal to the monetary equivalent of the change:  
( )s si ip VSL .  Consider next a policy that changes i’s current income by 
iA
iy .  MVi in this case is 
nothing other than iA
iy .
29  Finally, in the case where a policy changes both an individual’s 
survival probability and her current income, we have the formula MVi = ( ) i
As s
i i ip VSL y  .  The 
first term is the monetary equivalent for the risk change ∆pis, i.e., the risk change multiplied by 
s
iVSL ; the second term is the monetary equivalent for the income change 
iA
iy , which is, 
trivially, just iA
iy .  MVi is the sum of these two. 
 Several other points about VSL are worth noting at this juncture.  First, VSL is 
heterogeneous.  An individual’s VSL with respect to a current or future period depends upon her 
age, current and future (and perhaps past) income, and current and future (and perhaps past) non-
income attributes. These can all, of course, vary among individuals, and so VSL can vary as 
well. 
 Second, an individual’s MV is only an approximation to her compensating variation or 
equivalent variation, and this approximation may well be quite poor for policies that produce a 
large change in the individual’s survival probabilities or non-income attributes.  In particular,  
the component of MV for valuing a change to an individual’s period s survival probability—
( )s si ip VSL —reflects the marginal impact of income on the individual’s expected utility.  The 
individual’s willingness to pay for a non-marginal reduction in risk, or her willingness to accept 
in return for a non-marginal increase in risk, will not generally be equal to or even well 
                                                 
28 Similar formulas can be defined for policies that change non-income attributes, but because the model of social 
distancing below will focus on changes to risks and incomes, I won’t spell out such formulas here. 
29 Note that MVi in this simple case is not merely an approximation for the compensating and equivalent variation, 
but indeed exactly equal to both.   
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approximated by ( )s si ip VSL if her marginal utility of income is not constant and ∆pi
s is 
sufficiently large.  
 For an illustration of this point, consider a simple version of the conceptual framework 
here in which each individual is endowed with a lifetime vector of survival probabilities and 
incomes.  The period length is one year; non-income attributes are ignored; and the individual 
consumes her income each period.  Using this model, and the most recent available U.S. survival 
curve, I calculated equivalent variations, compensating variations, and MV values for a 50 year 
old individual earning $60,000/year with an additive lifetime utility function equaling the sum of 
log income.30  I assumed that the individual’s current-year survival probability was as per the 
survival curve (.99597), minus 0.01.  In short, in the status quo the individual’s ordinary current-
year survival probability has been lowered by 1% by virtue of some significant, short-term 
fatality risk (such as a pandemic).  Under all the assumptions just stated, the individual’s VSL for 
a current-year change in survival probability is $9,081,485.   
 Table 1 displays the individual’s equivalent variations, compensating variations, and 
MVs for a policy that improves her survival probability by amounts ranging from 1 in 1 million 
to 1%.  (MV is simply $9,081,485 times the risk change.)  As Table 1 shows, MV becomes an 
increasingly poor approximation to the equivalent or compensating variation as the risk change 
from the policy increases.  At the 1% level (a policy that wholly eliminates the acute current-year 
risk), the MV is $90,814.85, while her equivalent variation is more than twice that amount, and 
her compensating variation roughly half. 
Table 1: Equivalent Variations, Compensating Variations, and  
VSL-based Monetary Valuations (MVs) 
 
 
Probability Change 
 
Equivalent  
Variation 
 
Compensating 
Variation 
 
 
MV 
Diff. between Equiv. 
Variation and MV 
as % of MV 
Diff. between Comp. 
Variation and MV 
as % of MV 
1 in 1 million $9.08 $9.08 $9.08 .01% .01% 
1 in 100,000 $90.88 $90.75 $90.81 .08% .08% 
1 in 10,000 $915.06 $901.22 $908.15 .76% .76% 
1 in 1000 $9804.79 $8419.70 $9081.48 7.96% 7.29% 
5 in 1000 $67,885.45 $31,742.11 $45,407.42 49.50% 30.09% 
1 in 100 $212,578.16 $46,590.54 $90,814.85 134.08% 48.70% 
 
 The third and final observation about VSL worth noting at this juncture is closely related 
to the second.  Because an individual’s MV is only an approximation to her equivalent and 
compensating variations, VSL-CBA—the sum of MVs—need not conform to Kaldor-Hicks 
                                                 
30 Temporal additivity and having utility be logarithmic in income are both quite standard assumptions in 
economics.  Appendix D gives explicit formulas for equivalent and compensating variations applicable to the 
example here.  
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efficiency.  A policy may be ranked above the status quo by VSL-CBA and yet not be Kaldor-
Hicks efficient relative to the status quo.   
 To continue with the above example:  Imagine that there are a certain number of at-risk 
individuals in the population similarly situated to the individual above; and that, for each such 
individual, there are 1000 potential cost-bearers who aren’t at risk but would bear the cost of any 
policy to reduce or mitigate the risk.  Each at-risk individual has an MV of $90,814.85 for a 
policy that eliminates the 1% risk, but a compensating variation of only $46,590.54.  She is 
willing to pay no more than $46,590.54 to eliminate the risk.  Imagine, now, that the per-capita 
cost of a policy to eliminate the risk is between $46.59 and $90.81.  Such a policy is approved by 
VSL-CBA (it has a positive sum of MVs), but is not Kaldor-Hicks efficient.  There is no scheme 
of compensating payments from the at-risk individuals to the cost-bearers which, if adopted 
together with the policy, makes everyone better off than the status quo. 
 The conceptual framework set out here can also be used to highlight the difference 
between VSL-CBA and utilitarianism.  While VSL-CBA ranks policies according to the sum of 
individuals’ MVi values, utilitarianism assigns each policy a score equaling the sum of 
individuals’ expected utilities and ranks policies in the order of these scores.31  Let ∆Ui denote 
the difference in i’s expected utility between a given policy and the status quo.  Utilitarianism 
says that the policy is better than the status quo if the sum of these ∆Ui values is positive; by 
contrast, VSL-CBA says that the policy is better than the status quo if the sum of the MVi values 
is positive. 
 To illustrate the difference, consider a policy that changes i’s period s survival probability 
by small amount s
ip  and her current income by a small amount 
iA
iy .  In this case: 
(2) ( , , ) ( , , )( ) ( )
i
i i i i i ii
As i i
i i i As
i i
U U
U p y
p y
 
      
 
p y b p y b   
The first term in this equation is the approximate change in expected utility that results from the 
risk change; it is s
ip multiplied by individual i’s status quo marginal utility of period s survival 
probability.  The second term is the approximate change in expected utility that results from the 
income change; it is iA
iy multiplied by the status quo marginal utility of current income.  
Consider now the formula for MVi.  Recalling that VSL is the ratio of the marginal utilities of 
survival probability and income, we have: 
                                                 
31 I focus in this Article on utilitarianism understood as the sum of individuals’ von-Neumann/Morgenstern (vNM) 
utilities. Ui(∙) is a vNM utility function.  If individuals have homogeneous preferences with respect to lifetime 
bundles of income and non-income attributes, and lotteries over these bundles, then utilitarianism is implemented by 
choosing any one of the vNM utility functions representing the common preferences and setting Ui(∙) to be this 
function.  If individuals have heterogeneous preferences, then we take a vNM utility function representing each 
preference in the population and rescale it using scaling factors.  In this case, Ui(∙) is the rescaled vNM utility 
function representing the preferences of individual i.  See Adler (2019, ch. 2 and Appendix D); Adler (2016b). 
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(3) 
( , , )
/
/
i
i i ii
s
As i i
i i iA
i i
U p
MV p y
U y
 
   
 
p y b
  
Comparing the formulas for ∆Ui and MVi, two differences emerge.  (1) While the ∆Ui formula 
multiplies s
ip  by the marginal utility of period s survival probability, the MVi formula does the 
same but then divides by the marginal utility of current income.  Consider, for example, two 
individuals facing the very same small change in current survival probability.  The relative 
valuation of these two changes, according to utilitarianism, depends upon the individuals’ 
relative marginal utilities of current survival probability. By contrast, according to VSL-CBA, 
the relative valuation of the two changes depends upon these marginal utilities of survival 
probability and the two individuals’ relative marginal utilities of current income.  (2) While the 
∆Ui formula multiples i
A
iy by marginal utility of current income, the MVi formula simply adds 
iA
iy without adjustment.  This difference illustrate why utilitarianism is sensitive to income 
distribution,32 while VSL-CBA is not.  Imagine that a policy redistributes a small ∆y in current 
income from individual i to individual j.  VSL-CBA sees this policy as a wash: MVi decreases by 
∆y, while MVj increases by ∆y, and thus the sum of these monetary valuations does not change.  
By contrast, the relative magnitudes of ∆Ui and ∆Uj depend upon the individuals’ relative 
marginal utilities of current income.  If individual i has lower marginal utility of income than j,  
∆Ui will be smaller in magnitude than ∆Uj, and so utilitarianism will see the income 
redistribution as an improvement. 
 Finally, the difference between prioritarianism and VSL-CBA can also be illustrated in 
the conceptual model being deployed here.  Prioritarianism sums expected transformed utilities, 
using a concave transformation function (so as to give greater weight to the worse off).33  Let 
∆Gi denote the difference in i’s expected transformed utility between a given policy and the 
status quo; the prioritarian score for the policy is the sum of these ∆Gi values.  Consider once 
more a policy that changes i’s period s survival probability by small amount s
ip  and her current 
income by a small amount iA
iy .  In this case: 
(4) ( , , ) ( , , )( ) ( )
i
i i i i i ii
As i i
i i i As
i i
G G
G p y
p y
 
      
 
p y b p y b   
                                                 
32 See Robinson, Hammitt and Zeckhauser (2016), documenting inattention to distribution in agency cost-benefit 
analyses of environmental, health and safety regulations. 
33 This is so-called “ex post” prioritarianism, as opposed to “ex ante” prioritarianism, a different version of 
prioritarianism under uncertainty.  This Article focuses on the “ex post” approach.  Ex ante prioritarianism violates a 
stochastic dominance axiom, and for that reason is quite problematic.  See generally Adler (2019, chs. 3-4). 
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While the formula above for MVi values a risk change (
s
ip ) by multiplying by the term 
i
s
i
U
p


 
and then dividing by a marginal income utility term
i
i
A
i
U
y


, the prioritarian formula instead 
multiplies by the term i
s
i
G
p


—this captures the effect of the risk change on expected transformed 
utility – and does not divide by a marginal income utility term.  Further, like utilitarianism, and 
unlike VSL-CBA, prioritarianism is sensitive to the distribution of income.  The income change 
for an individual, iA
iy , is multiplied by a term i
i
A
i
G
y


, capturing the effect of income on expected 
transformed utility.  
III. VSL and Pandemic Policy: A Simulation Model 
 A. A Simulation Model 
 In order to compare VSL with utilitarianism and prioritarianism in assessing pandemic 
policy, I construct a simulation model based upon the U.S. population survival curve and income 
distribution.  The population is divided into five income quintiles (denoted as “low,” “moderate,” 
“middle,” “high,” and “top”).  I assume that an individual remains in the same quintile her entire 
life.  An individual, at birth, is endowed with a survival curve and lifetime income profile.  The 
survival curve for the middle quintile is the U.S. population survival curve, while the curves for 
the other quintiles are adjusted up or down to match observed differences in life expectancy by 
income.  
 The lifetime income profile, for a given quintile, is constructed as follows.  Based upon 
U.S. governmental data, I estimate average after-tax-and-transfer individual income, by quintile, 
to be as follows: $21,961; $30,118; $41,349; $57,538; and $134,840.  An individual’s income at 
a given age is then scaled up or down from this baseline amount, in accordance with data 
concerning the time path of earnings. 
 I assume that the current population consists of seven age groups: individuals aged 20, 
30, 40, 50, 60, 70, and 80.  Each age group, in turn, has five income quintiles.  Thus the 
population consists of 35 age-income cohorts.  The proportions of the population in the seven 
age bands are chosen to match the actual age distribution of the current U.S. population. 
 Although in reality the COVID-19 pandemic increases individuals’ fatality risks over 
multiple years, I simplify the analysis by assuming that this risk manifests itself as an increased 
fatality risk only in the current year.  The baseline current-year survival probability for each age-
income cohort is taken from the survival curve for her income quintile, except that her survival 
chances have been made worse by the COVID-19 pandemic.  The baseline (status quo) captures 
the case in which the population is faced with the pandemic and government does nothing to 
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address it; social distancing policies will, then, reduce the COVID-19 risk, at some cost to 
individual incomes.  
 The COVID-19 risk for each age group is taken from the now-famous Imperial College 
report of March 2020, whose alarming estimates of the potential deaths from the virus triggered 
the adoption of shutdown policies in the U.K. and U.S.  This report estimated infection fatality 
ratios (IFRs) by age group and also estimated that 81% of the population in each country would 
be infected absent governmental intervention.34 Using the Imperial College IFRs by age and the 
81% infected estimate, I assigned the current year COVID-19 risks given in Table 2 to the seven 
age groups. 
Table 2:  Risk of Dying from COVID-19 Absent Policy to Suppress or Mitigate Pandemic 
Age group Baseline (No Intervention) Risk of Dying 
from COVID-19 in Current Year  
20 .024% 
30 .065% 
40 .122% 
50 .486% 
60 1.782% 
70 4.131% 
80 7.533% 
 
 I ignore non-income attributes and assume that an individual’s consumption in each year 
equals her income.  I assume a common, temporally additive, logarithmic, lifetime utility 
function: utility is the sum of the logarithm of consumption each year, minus a term to reflect the 
subsistence level of consumption.  
 In this setup, the utilitarian value of a policy is the sum of individuals’ expected utilities 
(according to the common utility function just described).  For prioritarianism, I use an Atkinson 
social welfare function with a moderate level of priority to the worse off, γ (the priority 
parameter) = 1.5. 
 More details about the simulation model, the lifetime utility function, and the utilitarian 
and prioritarian social welfare functions are provided in the Appendix. 
 VSLs for the 35 age-income cohorts, for a current-year change in survival probability, 
were calculated using the above assumptions about survival curves and lifetime income profiles 
for each of the cohorts and the common lifetime utility function, and are displayed in Table 3: 
 
 
                                                 
34 Ferguson et al. (2020). 
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     Table 3:  Cohort VSLs 
 Income: Low Moderate Middle High Top 
Age:  20 $1,379,256  $2,181,761 $3,391,051   $5,240,842 $15,369,839 
30 $3,163,107  $5,005,939  $7,784,849  $12,026,744 $35,235,573 
40 $3,254,671  $5,191,073 $8,122,805  $12,593,803  $37,122,979   
50 $2,454,637  $3,967,977  $6,274,797    $9,791,316 $29,183,439 
60 $1,494,663  $2,458,852 $3,943,065    $6,207,337 $18,786,610 
70    $755,476   $1,272,810 $2,080,198    $3,313,544  $10,231,995 
80    $330,329      $570,613     $951,330     $1,533,270    $4,826,901 
 
The average VSL across the 35 cohorts (weighted for the different proportions of the age groups) 
is $8,635,355.  This is reasonably consistent with estimates of the U.S. population average VSL, 
typically in the range of $10 million.  Observe also that the pattern of VSL in Table 3 has two 
features observed in much empirical work: VSL increases with income;35 and its time profile has 
a “hump” shape—first increasing and then decreasing with age.36 
 The VSL information in Table 3 can be expressed in a different way.  Consider an 
increment ∆p in a given cohort’s current-year fatality risk (increment meaning either a reduction 
or increase).  The social value of that increment, according to VSL-CBA, is MVc = (∆p)VSLc.  
Let c+ be some reference cohort.  Then the relative value of an increment in fatality risk for 
cohort c, as compared to the value for the reference cohort, is just VSLc/VSLc+.  Table 4a 
expresses the VSL information in this fashion, with an 80-year old, low income group as the 
reference cohort. 
Table 4a:  Social value of risk increment according to VSL-CBA  
(relative to social value of risk increment for 80-year-old, low-income cohort) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For example, Table 4a has the number 15.7 in the cell for the 40-year-old, moderate income 
cohort.  This indicates that the MV for a given risk increment ∆p accruing to a member of the 40-
                                                 
35 See, e.g., Kniesner and Viscusi (2019); Viscusi (2018, ch. 6). 
36 See, e.g., Aldy and Viscusi (2007); Viscusi (2018, ch. 5). 
 Income: 
Low 
Moderate Middle High Top 
Age:  20 4.2   6.6 10.3 15.9  46.5 
30 9.6 15.2 23.6 36.4  106.7 
40 9.9 15.7  24.6 38.1 112.4 
50 7.4 12.0 19.0 29.6   88.3 
60 4.5   7.4 11.9 18.8   56.9 
70 2.3   3.9   6.3 10.0   31.0 
80 1.0   1.7    2.9   4.6   14.6 
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year-old, moderate-income cohort is 15.7 times the MV for the very same risk increment ∆p 
accruing to a member of the 80-year-old, low-income cohort.  The entry in the cell for the 20-
year-old, top-income cohort is 46.5.  So the MV for a risk increment of ∆p to this cohort is 46.5 
times that for the same increment to an 80-year-old, low-income individual; and 46.5/15.7 = 2.96 
times that for the same increment to a member of the 40-year-old, moderate income cohort.  
 Tables  4b and 4c display the analogous information for utilitarianism and 
prioritarianism.37  These show the relative social value of an increment ∆p in each cohort’s 
current-year fatality risk, again with 1 indicating its value to an 80-year-old low-income 
individual, according to utilitarianism (Table 4b) and prioritarianism (Table 4c).  The social 
value of a risk increment to a cohort member as per utilitarianism is not the individual’s MV, but 
rather the change in the individual’s expected utility; the social value as per prioritarianism is the 
change in the individual’s expected transformed utility. 
Table 4b:  Social value of risk increment according to utilitarianism  
(relative to social value of risk increment for 80-year-old, low-income cohort) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4c:  Social value of risk increment according to prioritarianism 
(relative to social value of risk increment for 80-year-old, low-income cohort) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 The numbers in tables 4a, 4b and 4c as well as 5a, 5b, and 5c are rounded to 1 decimal place (except for 
prioritarian income numbers, in Table 5c, for top-income cohorts) 
 Income: 
Low 
Moderate Middle High Top 
Age:  20 8.6 9.9 11.2 12.5 15.6 
30 7.4 8.6 9.7 10.8 13.5 
40 5.9 6.9 7.9 8.8 11.0 
50 4.4 5.2 6.0 6.7 8.6 
60 3.0 3.6 4.3 4.8 6.2 
70 1.9 2.3 2.7 3.1 4.2 
80 1.0 1.3 1.6 1.8 2.5 
 Income: 
Low 
Moderate Middle High Top 
Age:  20 31.5 29.6 27.9 26.3 23.2 
30 19.7  18.6 17.7 16.7 14.8 
40 11.9  11.4 11.0 10.5  9.5 
50   7.0   6.9   6.8  6.5 6.0 
60   4.0   4.0   4.0 4.0  3.7  
70   2.1   2.2   2.3 2.2 2.2 
80   1.0   1.1   1.1  1.1 1.1 
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 As emerges from these tables, the relative values of risk increment assigned by VSL are 
quite different from those assigned by either utilitarianism and prioritarianism.38  Within each 
income quintile, the utilitarian value of a risk increment decreases monotonically as individuals 
get older; saving a younger individual produces a larger gain in life expectancy and thus (within 
each income quintile) a larger gain in expected utility.  Prioritarian values also decrease 
monotonically—yet more sharply than utilitarian values, reflecting priority to younger cohorts 
(who are worse off with respect to expected lifetime utility.)  By contrast, the VSL-based values 
do not decrease monotonically with age.  Rather, they have the classic “hump” shape.  VSL-
based values reflect not merely the gain to expected utility, but also the expected marginal utility 
of income—which changes over time because income changes over time within each quintile, 
first increasing with age and then decreasing. (See Table 6.)  
 Within each age band, the utilitarian value of a risk increment increases moderately with 
income (social values for top-income individuals are roughly twice those of low-income 
individuals of the same age).  Because the utility of each year alive increases with income, the 
utilitarian value of extending a higher-income individual’s life by a year is greater than that of 
extending a lower-income individual’s life by a year.  VSL-based values also increase with 
income in each age band, but much more dramatically than utilitarian values.  VSL-based values 
are more highly skewed to the rich than utilitarian values, because the denominator of VSL is 
expected marginal utility of income—which decreases within each age band as income increases.  
Prioritarian values generally decrease or stay constant with income, reflecting priority for the 
worse off:  lower-income individuals within an age band are worse off with respect to lifetime 
utility. 
 Tables 5a, 5b, and 5c display the same information on the income side. These show the 
relative social value of a $1 increment in a cohort’s current income, again with an 80-year-old, 
low-income cohort as the reference cohort.  The number in each cell is the social value of a $1 
income increment, as a multiple of the value of a $1 income increment for an 80-year-old, low-
income individual.39  
 
 
                                                 
38 See Adler (2019, ch.5), for similar tables showing the relative risk valuations of utilitarianism, prioritarianism, and 
CBA, and for a longer discussion of why the three methodologies have different such valuations. 
39 Because the effect of an income increment on an individual’s expected utility and expected transformed utility is 
non-linear, the relative value of income increments for the cohorts displayed in Tables 5b and 5c depends upon the 
magnitude of the increment (here, $1).  MV values are linear in income increments, and so the constant pattern in 
Table 5a will hold true for any increment, not merely $1. 
By contrast, it can be shown that the effect of a current-year change in survival probability on individuals’ 
expected utility and expected transformed utility is linear. Thus the relative values stated in Tables 4b and 4c are 
independent of the size of the increment.  MV too, by construction, is linear in risk reduction, and thus the relative 
values in Table 4a (cohort VSLs, normalized by dividing by the VSL of the 80-year-old, low-income cohort) are 
also independent of the size of the increment.   
18 
 
 
Table 5a:  Social value of $1 income increment according to VSL-CBA  
(relative to social value of $1 increment for 80-year-old, low-income cohort) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5b:  Social value of $1 income increment according to utilitarianism  
(relative to social value of $1 increment for 80-year-old, low-income cohort) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5c:  Social value of $1 income increment according to prioritarianism  
(relative to social value of $1 increment for 80-year-old, low-income cohort) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The VSL-based social value of an income increment is constant (the number 1 is in every 
cell.) Recall Equation 3 above.  An increment ∆y to an individual’s income produces the very 
same change to her MV (namely, by ∆y), regardless of who receives it.  By contrast, utilitarian 
values decrease with income within each age band; this reflects the diminishing marginal utility 
 Income: 
Low 
Moderate Middle High Top 
Age:  20 1 1 1 1 1 
30 1 1 1 1 1 
40 1 1 1 1 1 
50 1 1 1 1 1 
60 1 1 1 1 1 
70 1 1 1 1 1 
80 1 1 1 1 1 
 Income: 
Low 
Moderate Middle High Top 
Age:  20 2.1 1.5 1.1 0.8 0.3 
30 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.1 
40 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 
50 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 
60 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.1 
70 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.1 
80 1.0 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.2 
 Income: 
Low 
Moderate Middle High Top 
Age:  20 3.2 1.8 1.1 0.7 0.20 
30 1.1 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.07 
40 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.05 
50 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.05 
60 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.05 
70 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.06 
80 1.0 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.08 
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of income.  Prioritarian values decreases yet more dramatically, reflecting both the diminishing 
marginal utility of income and priority for the worse off. 
 Given the fairly stark differences between the relative valuations of risk increment and 
income increment, as per VSL-CBA, and those relative valuations as per utilitarianism and 
prioritarianism, it is not surprising that the recommendations of VSL-CBA with respect to social 
distancing policy are different from those of the latter two methodologies—as we’ll now see. 
B. Social Distancing Policy 
The current-year incomes of the various cohorts are displayed in Table 6.   To model 
social distancing policy, I assume that an 80% reduction in “GDP” (the sum of total current 
income across the cohorts) will completely eliminate the current-year COVID-19 risk (as given 
in Table 2).40 
Table 6:  Cohort Incomes   
 Income: Low Moderate Middle High Top 
Age:  20 $8,331 $11,425 $15,686 $21,827 $51,152 
30 $22,098 $30,306 $41,607 $57,896 $135,680 
40 $28,426 $38,984 $53,522 $74,476 $174,536 
50 $28,681 $39,334 $54,003 $75,145 $176,103 
60 $24,930 $34,189 $46,939 $65,316 $153,069 
 70 $19,719 $27,043 $37,128 $51,664 $121,075 
80 $14,757 $20,238 $27,784 $38,662 $90,605 
 
 I posit a concave function from GDP reduction to the reduction in COVID-19 risk.41  
Specifically, I set the COVID-19 risk reduction to be the square root of the GDP reduction, 
scaled so that a 80% reduction wholly eliminates the risk.  (See Appendix.).  A concave rather 
than linear or convex function is employed on the assumption that GDP reductions have a 
diminishing marginal impact on COVID-19 risk. The first 1% GDP loss produces a larger drop 
in COVID-19 risk than the second 1%, and so on. 
The assumptions just described are the base case for analysis.  To allow for the possibility 
that the base case may be too pessimistic or optimistic about the costs of eliminating COVID-19 
risk, I consider two alternative cases:  a 40% reduction in GDP wholly eliminates the COVID-19 
                                                 
40 This assumption is loosely based on Acemoglu et al. (2020, Figure 7).  Note: after the analyses for this Article 
were run, Acemoglu et al. released a new version of their paper, which (as of the date of this Article, June 25, 2020) 
is the posted version.  (Acemoglu et al. 2020b). The new Acemoglu et al. estimates of the GDP reduction needed to 
wholly eliminate the COVID-19 risk are more optimistic—closer to 40%.  See Acemoglu et al. (2020b, Figure 5.1).  
Because the intention of this Article is not to provide guidance with respect to COVID-19 policy, but rather to 
compare VSL-based CBA with utilitarianism and prioritarianism, I have retained the 80% figure roughly based on 
Acemoglu (2020 Figure 7) as the base case for analysis.  In any event, the 40% figure is covered here as the 
“optimistic case” and still shows significant differences between VSL-based CBA, on the one hand, and 
utilitarianism and prioritarianism, on the other. 
41 See Acemoglu et al. (2020 Figure 7). 
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risk (optimistic), and an 80% reduction only reduces the COVID-19 risk by half.  I also consider 
a third alternative (“convex case”): a 80% reduction in GDP wholly eliminates the COVID-19 
risk, and the function from GDP reduction to COVID-19 reduction is convex (increasing 
marginal impact of GDP reduction on the risk reduction) rather than concave. 
On the cost side, I consider two alternative cases: “regressive incidence” and 
“proportional incidence.”  “Regressive incidence” means a π% reduction in GDP is borne more 
heavily (in proportional terms) by the three lowest income groups within each age, than by the 
two higher quintiles.42  Proportional incidence means that individuals in all five quintiles incur a 
π% reduction in income when GDP is reduced by π%. 
The causal linkages between social distancing policy and GDP reduction, on the one 
hand, and between social distancing policy and reduction in COVID-19 risk, on the other, are 
quite uncertain—and certainly were highly uncertain at the beginning of the pandemic, which is 
the timing of the policy choice being modeled here. (The full spectrum of COVID-19 risk-
reduction options, including the option of wholly eliminating the risk via sufficiently stringent 
social-distancing measures, were only available to policymakers at the outset of the pandemic.)  
The assumptions I have adopted are not meant as best estimates, but rather as plausible, stylized 
facts that will illustrate the properties of the various assessment tools with respect to social 
distancing policy.  As already explained, the aim of this Article is methodological: not to provide 
guidance with respect to social-distancing policy, but to use the simulation model to illustrate the 
features of VSL. 
As illustrated in Table 7, the various cohorts have starkly opposing interests with respect 
to social distancing policy.  Table 7 shows the cohort breakeven GDP reduction (the largest 
reduction such that its expected utility is not lower than baseline43), depending on whether the 
cost incidence of the reduction is regressive or proportional.  (In each cell, the number above the 
slash is the cohort breakeven GDP reduction assuming regressive incidence; the number below 
the slash is for proportional incidence.) 
 
                                                 
42 Specifically, my assumptions regarding regressive incidence are as follows.  A π% reduction in GDP lowers 
income for individuals in the first three income quintiles (Low, Moderate and Middle) by π/80 of the difference 
between baseline income and subsistence income ($1000). Thus, an 80% reduction in GDP has the benefit of wholly 
eliminating the COVID-19 risk, but at the cost of reducing individuals in the first three quintiles to subsistence 
income.  As for the two higher-income groups:  a π% reduction in GDP reduces their income by (π/80)p, where p is 
chosen so that—given the above assumption about losses by the first three income quintiles—the overall reduction 
in GDP is π%.  With the income data being used, p = 0.7187.   
 On these assumptions, each of the first three income quintiles experiences a larger percentage reduction in 
income than the top two quintiles, for 0 < π ≤ 80.  “Regressive” is a slight misnomer, since the lowest quintile 
experiences a slightly lower percentage reduction than the second, in turn slightly lower than the third. 
43 Results for the simulation model were calculated for integer values of GDP reduction, and so the cohorts may be 
better off than baseline at these integer “breakeven” values.  It would also interesting to know the cohort-optimal 
values of GDP reduction, but determining these values for all thirty-five cohorts would be quite laborious. 
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Table 7: Cohort Breakeven GDP Reductions 
 Low Moderate Middle High Top 
20 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 0/0 
30 0/1 0/1 1/1 2/2 4/3 
40 1/2 2/3 2/4 6/4 9/7 
50 12/17 16/22 19/28 39/33 53/45 
60 45/58 52/68 58/75 80/80 80/80 
70 61/76 67/80 71/80 80/80 80/80 
80 63/75 69/80 73/80 80/80 80/80 
 
Older cohorts prefer a larger GDP reduction than younger ones.  Within each age band, richer 
individuals prefer a larger GDP reduction than younger ones.  This latter effect is dampened by 
shifting from regressive to proportional incidence, but not eliminated. 
The choice of social distancing policy is a matter of balancing the (starkly) opposing  
interests of the various cohorts.  VSL-CBA reaches a very different point of equipoise in this 
balancing, as compared with utilitarianism and prioritarianism.  
Table 8 gives the optimal degree of reduction in GDP, according to the three 
methodologies—in the base case; under alternative assumptions (more optimistic or less 
optimistic) regarding the efficacy of social distancing policy in eliminating COVID-19 risk; and 
in the convex case. 44 
Table 8: Optimal reduction in GDP 
    VSL-CBA Utilitarianism Prioritarianism 
Base Case- Regressive 
Incidence 
       27% 11 % 12 % 
Base Case – Proportional 
Incidence 
       27%  13% 14% 
Optimistic Case—
Regressive Incidence 
        40% 19% 19% 
Optimistic Case –
Proportional Incidence 
        40% 21% 23% 
Pessimistic Case—
Regressive Incidence 
         7% 4% 4% 
Pessimistic Case – 
Proportional Incidence 
         7%  4% 4% 
Convex Case—
Regressive Incidence 
         80% 0% 0% 
Convex Case—
Proportional Incidence 
         80% 0% 0% 
 
                                                 
44 For utilitarianism and prioritarianism, the optimal reduction was calculated exactly rather than using the marginal 
approximations stated in equations 2 and 4 above. 
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 Let’s first compare VSL-CBA to utilitarianism.  In the base case, utilitarianism 
recommends a 11% reduction with regressive incidence and a 13% reduction with proportional 
incidence.  The utilitarian social cost to a given reduction in income is lower if that loss is borne 
by higher-income groups (see Table 5b) and so shifting from regressive to proportional incidence 
increases the utilitarian optimum.  VSL-CBA is insensitive to cost distribution (see Equation 3 
and Table 5a), and so the optimum is a 27% reduction regardless of whether incidence is 
regressive or proportional. In either event, VSL-CBA’s optimal reduction of GDP is much larger 
(27% versus 11%/13%) than the utilitarian optimum.  Shifting to the optimistic and pessimistic 
cases does not change the pattern. VSL-CBA continues to prefer a much larger reduction than 
utilitarianism (40% versus 19%/21%; 7% versus 4%/4%). 
 Finally, in the convex case, the disparity between VSL-CBA and utilitarianism is quite 
extreme.  The two methodologies choose corner solutions, but different ones: utilitarianism (with 
either regressive or proportional cost incidence) recommends no reduction in GDP at all, while 
VSL-CBA recommends wholly eliminating the risk at the cost of an 80% GDP reduction. 
Why is VSL-CBA more stringent with respect to social distancing than utilitarianism?45  
There are two reasons, the first somewhat subtle.  Let π denote the degree of GDP reduction, and 
let ∆pc(π) denote the reduction in cohort c’s fatality risk as a function of π; ∆yc(π) the reduction 
in cohort c’s income as a function of π; and ∆Uc(π) the increase in cohort c’s expected utility.  As 
per Equation 2, ( ) ( ) ( )c cc c c
c c
U U
U p y
p y
  
 
    
 
 .  As per Equations 1 and 3, the VSL-based 
monetary value of a π reduction in GDP is as follows:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )c cc c c c c c
c c
U p
MV p VSL y p y
U y
    
  
      
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.  Multiplying both sides of this 
equation by ( )c cU y  , we have that ( ) ( ) ( )
c c c
c c c
c c c
U U U
MV p y
y p y
  
  
  
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, or that 
( ) ( )c c cMV U k   , with kc= 1/
c
c
U
y
 
 
 
 .  In short, a cohort’s VSL-based monetary valuation of 
a policy is approximately its change in expected utility, times a weighting factor equaling the 
inverse of the marginal utility of income.  
The optimal value of π, according to utilitarianism, is the value that maximizes the sum 
of ∆Uc across cohorts; while its optimal value, according to VSL-CBA, is the value that 
maximizes the sum of MVc across cohorts.  The kc weighting factor increases with income. Thus 
VSL-CBA in this optimization gives greater weight to utility impacts on higher-income cohorts, 
and less weight to utility impacts on lower-income cohorts, as compared to utilitarianism.  
                                                 
45 For a related discussion of why CBA and utilitarianism can diverge with respect to risk regulation, see Armantier 
and Treich (2004). 
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Note now that, with regressive and even with proportional incidence, richer cohorts tend 
to prefer a more restrictive social distancing policy than poorer cohorts.  (See Table 7.)46 Thus 
the effect of this skew towards the interests of higher-income cohorts is that VSL-CBA ends up 
with a more restrictive policy than utilitarianism. 
The second reason that VSL-CBA is more stringent with respect to social distancing than 
utilitarianism is that VSL-CBA overstates the benefits of “large” policies, which reduce risks at 
the cost of significant changes in individual incomes.47 
Turning now to prioritarianism: although in many contexts utilitarianism and 
prioritarianism can differ, here they converge.  In all cases (base, optimistic, pessimistic, and 
convex, with proportional or regressive incidence), the optimum reduction in GDP as per 
                                                 
46 Why do richer cohorts prefer a more restrictive social distancing policy than poorer cohorts?  Shutdown policy is 
(approximately) a uniform risk reduction across income groups.  Thus, on the risk side, each increment in π 
produces a larger increase in the expected utility of a richer group as compared to a poorer group.  (See Table 4b.)  
On the cost side, whether each increment in π yields a smaller or larger loss in the expected utility of richer groups 
depends upon cost incidence. With a logarithmic utility function and proportional incidence, a given increment in π 
yields the same utility cost for different income groups within each age band. With regressive incidence, a given 
increment yields a larger utility cost for lower income groups. In either event, the net utility impact of an increment 
in π (utility benefit from risk reduction minus utility cost from income loss) is always larger for richer than smaller 
groups.  Thus richer groups tend to prefer a larger π than poorer groups, as illustrated in Table 7. 
47 Consider the additive utility function used in the simulation; see Appendix B.  Let Ac denote the number of the 
current period for cohort c.  As in the text, let pc denote the cohort’s current survival probability (shorthand for c
A
cp ) 
and let yc denote the cohort’s current income ( c
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cy ).   So as to avoid using the symbol π to mean two different 
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and also strictly concave (diminishing marginal income utility).  Observe that the term in brackets in the formula for 
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, with E a positive error term the magnitude of which 
increases with ∆yc(π).   In turn, MVc(π) = (∆Uc(π) + E)kc.  In short, MVc is skewed upwards relative to ∆Uc, and 
increasingly so as ∆yc becomes large.  
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prioritarianism is the same as, or quite close to, the utilitarian optimum—and thus much lower 
than VSL-CBA’s recommendation.48   
In short, relative to the utilitarian benchmark and to a prioritarian benchmark, VSL-CBA 
is significantly more restrictive.49 
Can CBA’s recommendations with respect to shutdown policy be defended on alternative 
grounds—by appeal to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency?  I calculated cohorts’ actual willingness to 
pay/accept amounts at the CBA optimum in the base case (27% reduction).  At the optimum, all 
the cohorts aged 40 and younger are worse off than the status quo, as are the three age-50 cohorts 
at low, moderate and middle income.  All the cohorts aged 60 and above are better off than the 
status quo, as are the two higher-income age-50 cohorts.50  Total willingness-to-pay of the better-
off cohorts does in fact exceed the total willingness-to-accept of the worse-off cohorts.  So the 
optimum is Kaldor-Hicks efficient relative to the no-intervention baseline. 
 However, many of the non-optimal policies that CBA scores as an improvement relative 
to the status quo are not Kaldor-Hicks efficient.  In the model here, every reduction in GDP 
(from 1% to 80%) is assigned a positive score (positive sum of MVs), relative to the baseline of 
0% reduction.  In other words, every reduction is seen by CBA as an improvement over the 
status quo.  However, reductions at or above 37% are not Kaldor-Hicks efficient.  In particular, 
CBA prefers to wholly eliminate the COVID-19 risk, at the cost of 80% of GDP, as compared to 
the no-intervention status quo; but at 80% reduction, only 6 of the 35 cohorts are better off than 
                                                 
48Prioritarianism is more concerned than utilitarianism with reducing risks among the young.  (Compare Tables 4b 
and 4c.) Baseline COVID-19 risk increases with age, and thus the effect of any COVID-19 policy (in the model 
here) is to produce a smaller risk reduction for younger than older cohorts. These effects roughly cancel, and so 
prioritarianism ends up with roughly the same social distancing recommendation as utilitarianism.  
 As mentioned, the prioritarian results in the social-distancing analysis are for “ex post” prioritarianism.  As 
a sensitivity analysis, I computed optimal GDP reduction for “ex ante” prioritarianism in the base case.  Ex ante 
prioritarianism prefers a 9% reduction given regressive incidence and an 11% reduction given proportional 
incidence.   
49 A third possible source of the divergence between VSL-CBA and utilitarianism with respect to social distancing 
policy is the fact that the two methodologies, in the model here, have different patterns of valuation of risk reduction 
with age.  Utilitarian values decrease monotonically, while VSL-CBA values do not.  (Compares Tables 4a and 4b.)  
To test whether this divergence helps explain the divergent social-distancing recommendations, I undertook an 
alternative analysis in which the time path of income within each quintile is constant.  At every age, individuals 
receive the very same income, depending on quintile: $21,961 (low); $30,118 (moderate); $41,349 (middle); 
$57,538 (high); and $134,840 (top).  In this case, I find that utilitarianism with regressive incidence recommends a 
12% GDP reduction, and with proportional incidence a 14% GDP reduction, while VSL-CBA recommends a 29% 
reduction.  Thus the differing patterns of risk valuation by age do not appear to contribute to the VSL-
CBA/utilitarianism divergence with respect to social distancing. 
50 These willingness-to-pay/accept amounts are the individuals’ compensating variations (equilibrating changes to 
the incomes that individuals would have with the policy).  It is the sum of compensating variations which tracks 
whether a policy is Kaldor-Hicks efficient relative to the status quo: if the sum is positive, there is a scheme of 
transfers which, if costlessly implemented together with the policy, would make everyone better off than in status 
quo. 
 Compensating variations were calculated assuming regressive incidence. With progressive incidence, a 
different array of groups might be better off than the status quo (compare the numbers above and below the slash in 
each cell in Table 7), but the sum total of compensating variations would be the same. 
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the status quo (high and top-income individuals aged 60, 70 and 80) and their total willingness to 
pay for 80% shutdown is insufficient to compensate the 29 cohorts who are worse off. 
IV. Population-Average VSL 
 The previous two parts focused on textbook VSL-based CBA (“VSL-CBA”).  VSL varies 
among individuals (Equation 1) and these individual-specific VSLs are used to compute MVs.   
 As already mentioned, governmental agencies in the U.S. employ a single population-
average VSL.  I’ll refer to CBA with a population-average VSL as “VSLavg-CBA.”  It uses this 
single conversion factor to calculate MVs.  
 While MVi calculated with individual i’s VSL is a good approximation to her 
compensating variation and equivalent variation for a small change in survival probability and 
other attributes, relative to the status quo, this is not true of MVi calculated with a population-
average VSL.  The point is well illustrated with the simulation model presented in Part III, which 
I’ll continue to use in this Part.  The cohort-specific VSLs are given in Table 3. The population-
average VSL (weighting by the proportion of the various age groups in the population) is 
$8,635,355. The cohort-specific VSLs are generally significantly different (larger or smaller) 
than this average.  For example, a 60-year old middle-income individual has a VSL of 
$3,943,065.  That individual’s equivalent variation and compensating variation for a 1-in-1 
million reduction in current fatality risk is approximately $3.94, and for a 1-in-100,000 reduction 
is approximately $39.43. But his MV according to VSLavg-CBA is $8.64 in the first case and 
$86.35 in the second.  
  We saw earlier that VSL-CBA need not conform to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.  The 
divergence between VSL-CBA and Kaldor-Hicks efficiency occurs as MVi diverges from i’s 
equivalent and compensating variations.  VSLavg-CBA also need not conform to Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency, and can diverge even for small changes from the status quo (since MVi calculated 
with population-average VSL is not a good approximation to the equivalent or compensating 
variation even for a small change).  For example, imagine that there are 1 million individuals in 
the 40-year old, low-income cohort (with a cohort VSL of $3,254,671), and a policy will reduce 
each individual’s risk by 1 in 100,000, at a total cost of $50 million.  VSLavg-CBA approves the 
policy, since the population-average VSL of $8,635,355 multiplied by 1-in-100,000 summed 
over the million individuals equals $86.35 million, which exceeds the cost of $50 million.  But 
individuals in the cohort are actually willing to pay, in total, only $32.55 million for the policy.  
Whoever the cost bearers might be, $32.55 million would be insufficient to fully compensate 
them. 
 Table 4d is the analogue to tables 4a, 4b, and 4c.  It gives the social value of an increment 
in current-year fatality risk according to VSLavg-CBA, with 1 indicating the value of a risk 
increment to the member of the 80-year-old, low-income cohort. 
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Table 4d:  Social value of risk increment according to VSLavg-CBA  
(relative to social value of risk increment for 80-year-old, low-income cohort) 
 
 
   
  
 
 
The entry in every cell in table 4d is the same (1), because a risk increment ∆p to any cohort is 
assigned the very same value, namely ∆p multiplied by $8,635,355. 
 On the income side, VSLavg-CBA values an income increment the same way as VSL-
CBA—a ∆y increment to anyone’s income changes her MV by ∆y—and so the relative value of 
income increments is given by the same table for both methodologies, namely table 5a. 
 The risk-increment and income-increment tables show that VSLavg-CBA diverges 
radically from utilitarianism and prioritarianism.  Nor, as just explained, can it be supported with 
reference to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.  
 Considerations of political feasibility may well push governments towards VSLavg-CBA.  
In the U.S., a tentative move by the EPA in 2003 in the direction of adjusting VSL by age 
prompted a harsh political reaction by interest groups representing older individuals.51  But such 
political constraints of course don’t constitute a normative justification for VSLavg-CBA. 
 In some respects, the methodology’s schedule of relative risk valuations (table 4d—every 
group has the same value of risk reduction) is intuitively attractive.  Surveys eliciting citizens’ 
views regarding the allocation of health care show no support for preferring the rich.52  In this 
respect, Table 4d is more intuitive than Table 4a (VSL-CBA) or Table 4b (utilitarianism).  
Moreover, Table 4d conforms to the intuition that every life has equal value—that there should 
be no differentiation whatsoever in deciding whose life to save or risk to reduce.  Yet surveys of 
citizens also find support for a conflicting intuition, namely that the young should receive 
priority over the old.53  Is it really the case that society should be indifferent between reducing an 
80-year-old’s risk of dying by ∆p and reducing a 20-year-old’s risk of dying by the same 
amount?  So intuitive support for Table 4d can hardly be said to be rock-solid.   
                                                 
51 This episode is discussed in Viscusi (2018, p. 93). 
52 See Dolan et al. (2005). 
53 See id.  
 Income: 
Low 
Moderate Middle High Top 
Age:  20 1 1 1 1 1 
30 1 1 1 1 1 
40 1 1 1 1 1 
50 1 1 1 1 1 
60 1 1 1 1 1 
70 1 1 1 1 1 
80 1 1 1 1 1 
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On the cost side, VSLavg-CBA, like VSL-CBA, is neutral to the distribution of the costs 
of risk reduction (table 5a).  This is not especially intuitive. 
 Turning to the model social-distancing policy:  VSLavg-CBA is dramatically more 
restrictive than VSL-CBA, let alone utilitarianism and prioritarianism.  In the base case, it 
recommends an 80% reduction, while VSL-CBA recommends 27%.  In the pessimistic case, it 
recommends a 25% reduction, while VSL-CBA recommends 7%.  (See Table 10.)  VSLavg-CBA 
advises a substantially greater reduction in risk and loss of income than VSL-CBA because the 
benefits of social distancing are skewed towards older cohorts, whose cohort-specific VSLs are 
generally less than the population average.  (VSLavg-CBA reaches the same result as VSL-CBA 
in the optimistic and convex cases.) 
 Recall that VSL-CBA’s recommendation (a 27% reduction) is Kaldor-Hicks efficient 
relative to the status quo.  VSLavg-CBA’s recommendation (an 80% reduction) is not. 
V. VSLY 
 The value of statistical life year (VSLY) is VSL divided by the life expectancy gained 
from a risk reduction.  Life expectancy gained might be discounted at the market interest rate or 
the individual rate of time preference, or undiscounted.  The conceptual points here apply to both 
discounted and undiscounted VSLY.54  The specific illustrations, drawn, from the simulation 
model, involved undiscounted VSLY. 
 At the individual level, VSL with respect to a particular time period can be expressed as 
such, or as VSLY.  Consider a policy that increases individual i’s period s survival probability by 
∆pis.  Recall that individual i’s VSL for that period, 
s
iVSL , is equal to her marginal rate of 
substitution between survival probability in period s and current income (Equation 1).  MVi in 
this case equals ( )s si ip VSL , which is a good approximation to her equivalent variation and 
compensating variation for the policy if ∆pis is small.   
Let s
iLE be the difference between (a) i’s current life expectancy if her probability of 
surviving period s conditional on being alive at the beginning of s is 1, and (b) her current life 
expectancy if her probability of surviving period s conditional on being alive at the beginning of 
s is 0.  Note that ( )s si ip LE is the gain to current life expectancy from a ∆pi
s increase in period s 
survival probability.  Let’s now define s
iVSLY as /
s s
i iVSL LE .  Then, by construction, 
( ) ( )s s s s si i i i i iMV p VSL p LE VSLY     .  Individual i’s MV for a period s risk reduction can be 
expressed either as her VSL for that period multiplied by the risk reduction, or as the gain to life 
expectancy from the risk reduction, multiplied by her VSLY for that period.  This period-and-
individual specific VSLY is well-defined, but has no advantages (or disadvantages!) over the 
                                                 
54 The conceptual points here about the relation between VSL and VSLY are not novel; see Hammitt (2007) and 
Jones-Lee et al. (2015). 
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period-and-individual specific VSL, since monetary valuations calculated either way are 
identical.  
It might be thought that we could calculate a period-invariant individual VSLY (let’s call 
it VSLYi), such that an individual’s VSL with respect to the current period or any future period 
is just equal to her life expectancy gain from surviving that period, multiplied by VSLYi.  That 
is:  for any period s, s s
i i iVSL VSLY LE  .  In other words, an individual’s willingness to pay for a 
small risk reduction in the current period or any future period is the gain to life expectancy, 
multiplied by a constant individual VSLY.  However, there is nothing in the theory of VSL to 
ensure that this is true.  For example, imagine that an individual consumes income when she 
receives it, and that the time path of future income is variable.  Between period s* and s**, her 
income will be higher than after s**.  If so, the individual will be willing to pay more in current 
income for a given increase in life expectancy secured through an increase in period s* survival 
probability, than for the same increase in life expectancy secured through an increase in period 
s** survival probability. There is no period invariant VSLYi such that  
* *s s
i i iVSL VSLY LE  and 
** **s s
i i iVSL VSLY LE  .
55  
 In short, at the individual level VSLY is either equivalent to VSL, or undefined.   
At the population level, however, we can define a population-average VSLY that is well 
defined and that gives rise to a form of CBA—for short, “VSLYavg-CBA”—that differs from 
both CBA with individual-specific VSLs (VSL-CBA) and CBA with a population-average VSL 
(VSLavg-CBA).  VSLYavg for a given period is just the average of individual VSLYs for that 
period.  VSLYavg-CBA assigns a monetary valuation to an individual’s risk reduction in period s 
equaling the increase in life expectancy multiplied by VSLYavg. 
We can use the simulation model to illustrate.  Table 9 gives the life-expectancy gains 
from preventing the current death of an individual in each of the 35 cohorts (that is, LEi
s with s 
the current period).   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
55 In the case at hand,
* * ** **
/ /
s s s s
i i i i
VSL LE VSL LE .  On a related point, Hammitt (2007, p. 236) observes: “If [as is 
often observed] an individual’s VSL first rises then falls with age, then her VSLY cannot be constant over her 
lifespan. Life expectancy typically decreases with age.” 
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Table 9: Life expectancy gains (years) from saving a cohort member in the current year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For each cohort, we divide the VSL (Table 3) by the life expectancy gain in Table 9 to arrive at a 
cohort VSLY, and then average these (weighting for the proportion of the different age groups in 
the population) to arrive at the population-average VSLY, which is $240,676. 
 An individual’s monetary valuation calculated using the population average VSLY need 
not approximate her equivalent or compensating variation, even for small changes.  This is 
because the individual’s VSLY for the specific period (here, the current period) need not be the 
same as the population-average VSLY for that period.  For example, VSL for a member of the 
20 year old, high-income cohort is $5,240,842.  Her VSLY is $5,240,842/60.1 = $87,202.  Her 
equivalent variation and compensating variation for a 1-in-100,000 increase in survival 
probability is approximately $52, which is her VSL times 1-in-100,000 or, equivalently, her 
VSLY times 1-in-100,000 times the life expectancy gain from preventing her death in the current 
period (60.1 years).  However, the population-average VSLY ($240,676) multiplied by 1-in-
100,000 multiplied by 60.1 years gives a monetary value of $145. 
 Thus VSLYavg-CBA need not conform to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, even for small risk 
changes (like VSLavg-CBA, but by contrast with VSL-CBA).  
 The relative social values of risk reduction implied by VSLYavg-CBA are presented in 
Table 4e.  As in the previous such tables, the values are normalized so that 1 indicates the value 
of risk reduction to a member of the 80-year-old, low-income cohort.  These relative valuations 
are just the relative life expectancy gains in Table 9.  
 
 
 
 
 
 Income: 
Low 
Moderate Middle High Top 
Age:  20 54.3 56.8 58.9 60.1 62.1 
30 45.1 47.5 49.5 50.6 52.5 
40 36.1 38.4 40.2 41.3 43.1 
50 27.4 29.5 31.2 32.2 33.9 
60 19.6 21.4 23.0 23.8 25.3 
70 12.8 14.2 15.4 16.2 17.4 
80 7.1 8.2 9.1 9.6 10.5 
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Table 4e:  Social value of risk increment according to VSLYavg-CBA 
(relative to social value of risk increment for 80-year-old, low-income cohort) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 These relative valuations are quite different from those in Tables 4b (utilitarianism) and 
4c (prioritarianism); and on the income side VSLYavg-CBA has a constant valuation (Table 5a), 
so is quite different from utilitarian and prioritarian valuations of income increments (Tables 5b 
and 5c).  In short, VSLYavg-CBA is grounded neither in utilitarianism, nor prioritarianism, nor 
(as we’ve just seen) Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.  Why adopt it? 
 VSLYavg –CBA conforms to the intuition that the social value of risk reduction should be 
lower for older individuals, since they have fewer life years remaining.  (The valuations in Table 
4e decrease according to life expectancy remaining.)  If one has this intuition, VSLYavg-CBA 
will be seen to be an improvement over VSLavg-CBA.  Further, it is dramatically less biased to 
the rich than VSL-CBA (Table 4a), and significantly less so than utilitarianism (Table 4b).  
Values increase with income in each age band in Table 4e only because higher income is 
associated with a more favorable survival curve and thus higher life expectancy—and not for the 
utilitarian reason that a year of life at higher income is better for well-being.   
 Note, however, that prioritarianism can avoid any bias towards the rich (see Table 4c) 
and in this sense has intuitive advantages over VSLYavg-CBA.   
 With respect to social distancing policy, VSLYavg-CBA is somewhat less restrictive than 
VSL-CBA in the base case.  It recommends a 23% reduction rather than 27%.  However, this 
recommendation is significantly more restrictive than utilitarianism and prioritarianism, which 
(recall) recommend at most 14% depending on incidence.  In the pessimistic case, VSLYavg-
CBA is again somewhat less restrictive than VSL-CBA (6% versus 7%).  In the optimistic and 
convex cases the two concur. 
 As regards Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, the recommendation of VSLYavg-CBA (23% 
reduction) is Kaldor-Hicks efficient relative to the status quo.  However, VSLYavg-CBA scores 
every reduction as an improvement over the status quo.  Recall that reductions at or above 37% 
are not Kaldor-Hick efficient.  
 Income: 
Low 
Moderate Middle High Top 
Age:  20 7.6 8.0 8.3 8.4 8.7 
30 6.3 6.7 6.9 7.1 7.4 
40 5.1 5.4 5.6 5.8 6.0 
50 3.8 4.1 4.4 4.5 4.8 
60 2.8 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.6 
70 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.4 
80 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.5 
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 Table 10 summarizes the recommendations of all the methodologies in all the cases, and 
Table 11 summarizes the results with respect to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. 
Table 10.   Social Distancing Policy: Optimal Degree of GDP Reduction 
   VSL-CBA VSLavg-CBA VSLYavg-CBA Utilitarianism Prioritarianism 
Base Case- 
Regressive 
Incidence 
       27%  80% 23% 11 % 12 % 
Base Case – 
Proportional 
Incidence 
       27%  80% 23% 13% 14% 
Optimistic Case—
Regressive 
Incidence 
        40% 40% 40% 19% 19% 
Optimistic Case –
Proportional 
Incidence 
        40% 40% 40% 21% 23% 
Pessimistic 
Case—Regressive 
Incidence 
         7% 25% 6% 4% 4% 
Pessimistic Case – 
Proportional 
Incidence 
         7%  25% 6% 4% 4% 
Convex Case—
Regressive 
Incidence 
         80% 80% 80% 0% 0% 
Convex Case—
Proportional 
Incidence 
         80% 80% 80% 0% 0% 
 
Table 11.   Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency (Base Case)  
 VSL-CBA VSLavg-CBA VSLYavg-CBA 
Optimal degree of GDP reduction  27% 80% 23% 
Is the optimum Kaldor-Hicks efficient 
relative to the status quo? 
Yes No Yes 
Does the methodology assign a positive 
score (indicating that the GDP reduction is 
an improvement over the status quo) to 
GDP reductions that are not Kaldor-Hicks 
efficient relative to the status quo? 
Yes (all reductions at 
or above 37%) 
Yes (all reductions 
at or above 37%) 
Yes (all reductions 
at or above 37%) 
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VI. Conclusion 
This Article has critically examined the use of VSL-based CBA as a methodology for 
setting fatality risk reduction policy.  I have done so via close consideration of a policy problem 
that, sadly, is all too timely: trading off the costs and benefits of social distancing to mitigate 
COVID-19.  I consider three versions of VSL: textbook, population-average, and VSLY.  
Strikingly, I find that all three recommend policies that deviate from Kaldor-Hicks 
efficiency (potential Pareto superiority), the traditional touchstone of CBA.  All three versions of 
VSL conclude that a range of social distancing policies would be better than the status quo (in 
my simulation, policies at or above a 37% reduction of GDP), even though these policies are not 
in fact Kaldor-Hicks efficient relative to the status quo.  CBA with population-average VSL 
optimizes at a policy that is not Kaldor-Hicks efficient relative to the status quo. 
Thus these VSL-based methodologies lack grounding in the standard normative 
justification offered for CBA.  Nor can they find normative support elsewhere.  Utilitarianism, 
the oldest example of a systematic welfarist approach to normative reasoning, recommends quite 
different social-distancing policies—as does prioritarianism, a newer variant of welfarism.  As 
for intuition: textbook VSL is quite counterintuitive, because it places a dramatically higher 
value on risk reductions for richer individuals; population-average VSL fails to differentiate with 
respect to age; and all three versions on the cost side are completely insensitive to the incidence 
of the costs of social distancing policy.  
My own view is that social distancing policy, and risk regulation more generally, should 
be set with reference to a utilitarian or prioritarian social welfare function.56  To be sure, this 
position implicates the long-running debate about the role of distributional considerations in non-
tax policies.57  The purist view, here, is that all non-tax policies should be designed to maximize 
the size of the “pie”—to be precise, the sum total of compensating variations relative to the 
status quo—and that the tax-and-transfer system should be used to share the “pie,” to everyone’s 
benefit. 
 There are various difficulties with the purist view,58 above all this: the changes to existing 
tax-and-transfer laws required to render a non-tax policy Pareto-superior to the status quo—
universally beneficial—are often merely hypothetical, given the actual political economy of the 
tax system.  In the case of social distancing policy, a pie-maximizing-and-sharing combination of 
policies would mean quite stringent and prolonged social distancing requirements combined with 
significant taxes on older individuals and substantial payments to younger ones. This doesn’t 
seem to be in the offing.  Pie-maximization without pie-sharing may well leave some groups 
much worse off than the status quo. 
                                                 
56 See Adler (2019, ch. 5); Adler (2017); Adler, Hammitt and Treich (2014): Adler, Ferranna, Hammitt and Treich 
(2019). 
57 See Kaplow (1996, 2004, 2008). 
58 See Adler (2019, pp. 225-33); Adler (2017).  
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 In any event, a key takeaway from this Article should be that the debate about the role of 
distributional considerations in non-tax policy is orthogonal to VSL.  The proponent of pie-
maximization-and-sharing needs a methodology that approves policies if and only if they are 
Kaldor-Hicks efficient relative to the status quo, and that optimizes at the largest sum of 
compensating variations relative to the status quo. Such a methodology is not VSL-CBA, nor 
VSLavg-CBA, nor VSLYavg-CBA.   
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Appendix 
A. Simulated Population 
 The population is divided into 35 cohorts: seven age groups (individuals age 20, 30, 40, 
50, 60, 70, and 80), each divided into five income quintiles (“Low,” “Moderate,” “Middle,” 
“High” and “Top”).  For the Middle income quintile, the survival probability in each year of life 
(the probability of surviving to the end of that year, conditional on being alive at the beginning) 
is set equal to the survival probability at each age in the most recent available U.S. population 
survival curve.59  Survival probabilities for the other groups are adjusted so as to roughly match 
the estimates of life expectancy for different income groups in Chetty et al. (2016).60  These 
survival probabilities for the five quintiles are then reduced to account for COVID-19 risk; see 
below, Appendix C. 
 Incomes by quintiles are based on the most recent available official data on average after-
tax-and-transfer household annual income.  By quintile, these incomes are:  $35,000; $48,000; 
$65,900; $91,700; and $214,900.  The incomes were divided by the square root of average 
household size (2.54) to arrive at estimates of after-tax-and-transfer individual income: $21,961; 
$30,118; $41,349; $57,358; $134,840.61  
 Data about the age distribution of income was used to estimate a time profile of income.62  
I estimated time factors for each year of life, and multiplied the quintile incomes above by the 
time factors to arrive at the income in that quintile in that year of life.  The time factors are as 
follows (rounded to no decimal places):  Ages 0 to 24: 38%.  Ages 25 to 29: 84%.  Ages 30 to 
                                                 
59 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, National Vital 
Statistics Reports (vol. 68, No. 7, June 24, 2019), Table 1 (U.S. life table for 2017). 
60 The mortality risk at each age is 1 minus the survival probability.  For income quintiles other than Middle income, 
mortality risks were taken from the U.S. survival curve, and then adjusted by a multiplicative factor in each year.  
The adjusted survival probabilities are, then, 1 minus the adjusted mortality risks.  The multiplicative factors for the 
Low, Moderate, High and Top quintiles were, respectively 1.5, 1.2, 0.9, and 0.75.  These multiplicative factors were 
chosen so that the ratio between life expectancy at age 40 for individuals in that quintile, and life expectancy at age 
40 for 50th percentile individuals, was approximately equal to the ratio as estimated by Chetty et al. (2016). 
61 The most recent data about after-tax-and-transfer household income (for 2016) was taken from: Congressional 
Budget Office, Projected Changes in the Distribution of Household Income, 2016 to 2021 (December 2019; 
available at www.cbo.gov/publication/55941). See id. Appendix B, Table B-1.  The recommendation to estimate 
individual income from household income by dividing by the square root of household size is taken from id., 
Appendix A.  The estimate of average household size at 2.54 was taken from the 2017 data (to match the survival 
curve) provided in U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, “Historical Households Tables,” Table HH6 
(“Average Population Per Household and Family”), available at https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-
series/demo/families/households.html. 
62 Mean income for various age bands (for 2016) was taken from U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 
“Tables for Personal Income,” Table PINC-01 (“Selected Characteristics of People 15 Years and Over, by Total 
Money Income, Work Experience, Race, Hispanic Origin, and Sex”), available at 
https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/cps-pinc/pinc-01.2016.html. 
 The age bands were as follows: 15 to 24; 25 to 29; 30 to 34; 35 to 39; 40 to 44; 45 to 49; 50 to 54; 55 to 59; 60 to 
64; 65 to 69; 70 to 74; 75 and over.  The income in each band was divided by mean income for all individuals 15 
and over ($46,550 as per this table) to arrive at the time factor for each year of life within the age band.  The time 
factor for individuals under 15 was set equal to that for individuals in the age band 15 to 24. 
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34: 101%.  Ages 35 to 39: 121%. Ages 40 to 44: 129%.  Ages 45 to 49:  130%.  Ages 50 to 54: 
131%.  Ages 55 to 59: 124%.  Ages 60 to 64: 114%.  Ages 65 to 69: 97%.  Ages 70 to 74:  90%.  
Ages 75 and over: 67%. 
 For example, the lifetime income profile for the Low quintile is such that an individual at 
age 62 will receive income equaling 114% of the quintile income of $21,961.  The lifetime 
income profile for the Top income quintile is such that an individual at age 38 will receive an 
income equaling 121% of the quintile income of $134,840.  And so forth.   
 The percentages of the current population in the seven age groups were estimated to be as 
follows (rounding to no decimal places): age 20: 18%; age 30: 18%; age 40: 16%;  age 50: 18%; 
age 60: 16%;  age 70: 10%;  age 80: 5%.  These percentages were taken from estimates of the 
current age distribution of the U.S. population.63  
B. Utility Function; Utilitarian and Prioritarian SWFs; VSL 
 The formulas here for individual expected utility as a function of age, lifetime income 
profile, and lifetime profile of survival probabilities, and the formulas for the utilitarian and 
prioritarian SWFs and VSL, are those given in Adler, Ferranna, Hammitt and Treich (2019), 
except for not including a utility discount factor and changes in notation.  This is in turn one 
version of the general model of utility and VSL presented in Part II.  In this version, utility is 
temporally additive; non-income attributes are ignored; income is consumed when received 
(myopic consumption); and individuals have homogeneous preferences, captured in a common 
utility function. 
 There is a fixed population of N individuals.  Each individual’s life is divided into periods 
numbered 1, 2, …, T, with T the maximum number of periods that any individual lives.  An 
individual either dies immediately after the beginning of the period or does not die and survives, 
at least, until the end of the period.  
 The number of the current period, for individual i, is Ai.  In the status quo, denoted with 
the subscript B (“baseline”), an individual i has a lifetime profile of survival probabilities: 
, ,( ,..., )
iA T
i B i Bp p .  An individual also has a status quo lifetime income profile:  
11
, , , ,( ,..., , ,..., )
i iA A T
i B i B i B i By y y y

.  A given policy P, denoted with the subscript P, endows each 
individual with a new lifetime profile of survival probabilities , ,( ,..., )
iA T
i P i Pp p and income profile 
11
, , , ,( ,..., , ,..., )
i iA A T
i P i P i P i Py y y y

.64  
                                                 
63 U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, “Age and Sex Tables; Age and Sex Composition in the United 
States,” Table 1 (2017) (“Population by Age and Sex”), available at https://www.census.gov/topics/population/age-
and-sex/data/tables.2017.html.  Each age group in the simulation was assigned the population percentage of the age 
bracket including that age from the table, and these percentages were then scaled up proportionally to sum to 100%. 
64 Policies don’t change individuals’ past incomes, so , ,
t t
i B i Py y  for t < Ai.   
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 In what follows, the B and P subscripts will be removed if the same generic formula 
applies both to individuals’ baseline profiles of survival probabilities and income amounts, and 
to individuals’ policy profiles of survival probabilities and income amounts.  (pi, yi) is shorthand 
for an individual profile: (pi, yi) = 
1(( ,..., ), ( ,..., ))i
A T T
i i i ip p y y .  (pi,B,yi,B) and (pi,P,yi,P) are, 
respectively, individual i’s baseline profile and her profile with policy P. 
 The survival probabilities, denoted with p, are conditional probabilities: pi
t is the 
probability that individual i survives to the end of period t, given that she is alive at the 
beginning.  Related probabilities can be derived from these.  Let πi(t; Ai), t ≥ Ai, denote i’s 
probability of surviving to the end of period t, given that she is currently alive at the beginning of 
Ai.  Then ( ; )
i
t
s
i i i
s A
t A p

 .  Let μi(t; Ai), t ≥ Ai – 1, denote i’s current probability of surviving to 
the end of period t and then dying during the next period.  (In other words, this is the current 
probability of living exactly t periods.)  If t = Ai – 1, μi(t; Ai) = 1 i
A
ip ,  If t ≥ Ai, μi(t; Ai) = 
1(1 ) ( ; )ti i ip t A
 . 
 For a past period (t < Ai), yi
t is the income that i earned in period t.  For the current period 
or a future period (t ≥ Ai), yit is the income which i will earn in t if she survives to its end. 
 The common period utility function is denoted as u(∙).  Let Vis(yi) denote the individual’s 
realized lifetime utility if she lives exactly s periods. 
1
( ) ( )
s
s s
i i i
t
V u y

y .  Individual i’s current 
expected utility, denoted as Ui(∙),65 is as follows:
1
( , ) (1 ) ( ) ( ; ) ( )i i
i
T
A A t
i i i i i i i i i i
t A
U p V t A V

  p y y y
.  It can also be shown that 
1
1
( , ) ( ) ( ; ) ( )
i
i
A T
t t
i i i i i i i
t t A
U u y t A u y

 
  p y . 
The utilitarian social welfare function, denoted WU, assigns a score to a policy or to the 
baseline as a function of individuals’ profiles of survival probabilities and incomes, and ranks 
policies relative to each and the baseline as a function of these scores.  The same is true for the 
ex post prioritarian social welfare function, denoted WEPP.  
1 1
1
(( , ),..., ( , )) ( , )
N
U
N N i i i
i
W U

p y p y p y .  WEPP is, more precisely, a family of social welfare 
functions—each defined by some strictly increasing and strictly concave transformation function 
g(∙).  1
1 1
1
(( , ),..., ( , )) (1 ) ( ( )) ( ; ) ( ( ))i i
i
N T
A AEPP t
N N i i i i i i i
i t A
W p g V t A g V
 
 
   
 
 p y p y y y   
                                                 
65 The “i” subscripts on U(∙) and V(∙) could be dropped, since these are common utility functions. 
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In the simulation model, policies are combinations of changes to individuals’ current 
survival probabilities and current incomes, relative to baseline.  The formulas here for VSL and 
VSL-CBA are for this specific case.  VSLi, in this case, is the marginal rate of substitution 
between individual i’s current survival probability and current income.  
, ,( ; )
/
/
i
i B i Bi
A
i i
i A
i i
U p
VSL
U y
 
 
 
p y
.  Using the formula for expected utility above, we have that 
,
,
,
, ,
( ; )
( )
( )
i
i
i i
T
i B i t
i BA
t A i B
i A A
i B i B
t A
u y
p
VSL
p u y





 , with 
uʹ(∙) the first derivative.  
Let (pi,yi) differ from i’s baseline profile only with respect to her current survival 
probability and/or income amount, if at all.  ,
i i iA A A
i i i Bp p p   .  ,
i i iA A A
i i i By y y   .  Then the 
individual’s VSL-based monetary valuation of this profile, MVi , is as follows: 
( , ) i i
A A
i i i i i iMV p VSL y  p y .  VSL-CBA—like utilitarianism and prioritarianism—assigns a 
score to a policy or to the baseline as a function of individuals’ profiles of survival probabilities 
and incomes, and ranks policies relative to each other and the baseline as a function of these 
scores.  This score is the sum of MV amounts. 1 1
1
(( , ),..., ( , )) ( , )
N
VSL CBA
N N i i i
i
W MV

p y p y p y .  
Note that MVi(pi,B,yi,B) = 0 and so the score assigned by VSL-CBA to the baseline is 0.  A policy 
is better than/worse than/equally good as baseline iff its score is positive/negative/zero. 
In the simulation model, the periodization is annual and the period utility function is 
logarithmic.  u(y) = log (y) – log (yzero), with yzero = $1000.  For an explanation of why a choice 
of yzero is needed to specify the utility function, see Adler (2019, pp. 292-94); Adler (2017, pp. 
71-72).  yzero can be thought of as subsistence income.  Extending a life by one period with 
income yzero leaves lifetime utility unchanged.  The level of $1000 was chosen based roughly on 
the World Bank extreme poverty level of $1.90/day.  See Adler (2017, pp. 71-72). 
The Atkinson prioritarian SWF, which has attractive axiomatic properties, uses a power 
function.  1
1
( )
1
g V V 



, γ > 0.  See Adler (2019, pp. 154-58, 274-75).  As γ increases, 
priority for the worse off increase.  I choose γ = 1.5, which has the effect of generally nullifying 
a utilitarian preference to reduce the risks of those at higher incomes.  See Table 4c.  
Baseline incomes for individuals in the 35 cohorts are as stated in Appendix A above; 
baseline survival probabilities are adjusted for the COVID-19 risk, as explained in Appendix C. 
VSLavg-CBA, as explained in the main text, uses the same formula as VSL-CBA except 
for using the population-average VSL to compute individuals’ MV amounts. 
43 
 
Let Li denote individual i’s life expectancy with a given vector of survival probabilities. 
( ) (1 )( 1) ( ; ) ( 1) ( ; )i
i i
T T
A
i i i i i i i i i
t A t A
L p A t A t A t A 
 
       p .  Let iAiLE  or, for short, LEi denote 
the difference between i’s baseline life expectancy if she survives the current period and her 
baseline life expectancy if she dies during the period.  
,
,
( ; )
( 1)
i
i
T
i B i
i iA
t A i B
t A
LE t A
p


   .  As above, 
let (pi,yi) differ from i’s baseline profile only with respect to her current survival probability 
and/or income amount, if at all.  ,
i i iA A A
i i i Bp p p   .  ,
i i iA A A
i i i By y y   .  Then the difference in i’s 
life expectancy between policy and baseline, Li(pi) − Li(pi,B) = i
A
i ip LE .  
iA
iVSLY  or, for short, 
VSLYi equals VSLi/LEi.   
 Let VSLYavg be the population average VSLY.  Then VSLYavg-CBA sums monetary 
valuations defined in terms of this population average.  
( , ) ( )( )
avg
i iA AVSLY avg
i i i i i iMV p LE VSLY y  p y   
C. Social Distancing Policy 
  Let oi,B denote individual i’s baseline (no-governmental intervention) risk of dying during 
the current year from COVID-19.  oi,B for the various cohorts is given in Table 2 (based upon the 
IFRs from Ferguson et al. (2020) and the estimate that, without intervention, 81% of the 
population would be infected).  oi,P is the individual’s risk of dying during the current year from 
COVID-19 after policy intervention P. 
 Let pi* denote individual i’s current-year survival probability, but for the pandemic.  
(These survival probabilities, for the various cohorts, are based upon the U.S. survival curve as 
described in Appendix A, first paragraph.).  Individual i’s baseline current-year survival 
probability with the COVID-19 risk, ,
iA
i Bp , is set as follows:  
*
, ,(1 )
iA
i B i i Bp p o  .  Intuitively, i 
survives the current year only if she is not killed by non-COVID-19 causes and is not killed by 
COVID-19.  Assuming these probabilities are independent—to be sure, a simplification—we 
have the formula here.  Similarly, *, ,(1 )
iA
i P i i Pp p o  . 
 I model COVID-19 reduction as a concave function of GDP reduction. If GDP is reduced 
by π%, , , (1 / 80)i P i Bo o e   .  In the base case (e =1), 80% reduction wholly eliminates the 
risk.  In the optimistic case (e = √2), a 40% reduction wholly eliminates the risk.  In the 
pessimistic case (e = 0.5), an 80% reduction eliminates half the risk.  In the convex case, 
2
, , (1 ( ) )
80
i P i Bo o

  . 
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On the cost side, regressive incidence is as follows.  After a π% reduction in GDP: (1) if 
individual i is in the Low, Moderate, or Middle income quintiles, 
, , ,( )( 1000)
80
i i iA A A
i P i B i By y y

   ; 
and (2) if individual i is in the High or Top income quintiles,  
, , (1 ( ) )
80
i iA A
i P i By y q

  , with q 
chosen based upon cohort baseline incomes so that the reduction in total income is π%.  In the 
model here, q = 0.7187.   
Proportional incidence is straightforward:  After a π% reduction in GDP,  
, , (1 ( ))
100
i iA A
i P i By y

  for individuals in all cohorts. 
D. Equivalent and Compensating Variations 
 Using the utility model set forth in Appendix B., we can define equivalent variations 
(EVi) and compensating variations (CVi).  EVi(pi, yi) = ∆y* such that:  
11 1
, , , , , ,(( ,..., ), ( ,..., )) (( ,..., ), ( ,..., , *,..., ))
i i i iA A A AT T T T
i i i i i i i B i B i B i B i B i BU p p y y U p p y y y y y
  .  CVi(pi, yi) = ∆y+ 
such that: 
11 1
, , , ,(( ,..., ), ( ,..., )) (( ,..., ), ( ,..., , ,..., ))
i i i iA A A AT T T T
i i B i B i B i B i i i i i i iU p p y y U p p y y y y y
   . 
 Assume, more specifically, that (pi, yi) differs from baseline only with respect to current 
survival probability and/or current income, if at all.  As a short hand, let Ui denote Ui(pi, yi) and 
Ui,B denote Ui(pi,B, yi,B).  Then (1) Ui,B = 
1
, , , , ,
1 1
( ) ( ; ) ( ) ( ; ) ( )
i
i
i
A T
At t
i B i B i i i B i B i i B
t t A
u y A A u y t A u y 

  
   .  
Also, the compensating variation ∆y+ is s.t. (2) Ui,B = 
1
, ,
1 1
( ) ( ; ) ( ) ( ; ) ( )
i
i
i
A T
At t
i B i i i i i i i B
t t A
u y A A u y y t A u y 


  
     
(3) Ui =
1
, ,
1 1
( ) ( ; ) ( ) ( ; ) ( )
i
i
i
A T
At t
i B i i i i i i i B
t t A
u y A A u y t A u y 

  
   .  Also, the equivalent variation ∆y* is 
s.t.  (4) Ui = 
1
, , , , ,
1 1
( ) ( ; ) ( *) ( ; ) ( )
i
i
i
A T
At t
i B i B i i i B i B i i B
t t A
u y A A u y y t A u y 

  
     .  
 Subtracting the fourth equation from the first, we have that Ui,B – Ui = 
 , , ,( ; ) ( ) ( *)i iA Ai B i i i B i BA A u y u y y    .  Subtracting the third from the second, we have that Ui,B – 
Ui=  ( ; ) ( ) ( )i iA Ai i i i iA A u y y u y   .  Observe also that , ,( ; ) iAi B i i i BA A p  and that
( ; ) i
A
i i i iA A p  .   
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 With the logarithmic specification of u(∙), u(y) = log (y) – log (1000), we can use these 
last equations to solve explicitly for ∆y* and ∆y+.  
,
,
,
* exp 1i
i
i i BA
i B A
i B
U U
y y
p
  
      
  
.  
,
1 expi
i
i B iA
i A
i
U U
y y
p

  
     
  
.   
